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       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-1712 
___________ 
 
OLEKSANDR OLIYNYK, AKA Oliynyk V. Oleksandr,  
AKA Oleksandr V. Oliyntk, AKA Oleksandr V. Oliynyk,  
Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A205-986-682) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Steven A. Morley 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 4, 2018 
 
Before:  VANASKIE, COWEN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 6, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se petitioner Oleksandr Oliynyk petitions for review of a final order of 
removal.  For the reasons detailed below, we will deny the petition. 
 Oliynyk is a citizen of the former U.S.S.R.  He entered the United States in 1999 
(he claims) or 2002 (the Government claims) on a student visa.  In 2014, he was 
convicted in Pennsylvania state court of theft by deception and sentenced to three-and-a-
half to seven years’ imprisonment.  In 2017, the Government charged Oliynyk with being 
removable because (1) he had been convicted of a theft offense that qualified as an 
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G); (2) he had been convicted of an 
offense involving fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victims exceeded $10,000 that 
qualified as an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(M); and (3) he had failed to 
maintain or comply with the conditions of his nonimmigrant status under 
§ 1227(a)(1)(C)(i).   
 Oliynyk, who has proceeded pro se throughout these proceedings, has zealously 
litigated his case.  Before an Immigration Judge (IJ), he applied for asylum, withholding 
of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  He claimed that he 
feared that Ukrainian nationalists would harm him due to his Russian ethnicity.  He also 
alleged that the Government had failed to establish that he had actually been convicted of 
the theft-by-deception offense and raised numerous procedural objections.  Ultimately, 
the IJ denied all relief to him and ordered his removal.  Oliynyk appealed to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA), raising numerous claims.  In a thorough decision, the BIA 
affirmed the IJ in all respects and dismissed the appeal.  Oliynyk then filed a petition for 
review to this Court.   
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 We generally have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1).  However, because, as we discuss below, we conclude that Oliynyk is 
removable for having committed an aggravated felony, § 1252(a)(2)(C)’s jurisdiction-
stripping provision applies.  See generally Singh v. Att’y Gen., 839 F.3d 273, 282 (3d 
Cir. 2016).  As a result, our jurisdiction is limited to questions of law and constitutional 
claims.  See § 1252(a)(2)(D). 
Oliynyk’s first argument is that the Government failed to carry its burden of 
proving that he was actually convicted of the theft offense.  We are not persuaded.  The 
Government presented a court-commitment form, a sentencing sheet, trial- and appellate-
court dockets, and transcripts of his trial and sentencing proceedings, all of which show 
that Oliynyk was convicted of theft by deception.1  See A.R. at 392-448, 870-946.  This 
evidence amply documented Oliynyk’s conviction.  See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41 
(listing documents that can be used to prove a criminal conviction).  At times Oliynyk 
also seems to argue that he is innocent of the offense, but he cannot collaterally attack his 
criminal judgment in removal proceedings.  See Drakes v. INS, 330 F.3d 600, 602-04 (3d 
Cir. 2003).   
Oliynyk did not argue in his appeal to the BIA that a conviction for theft by 
deception does not qualify as an aggravated felony, and he consequently has not 
exhausted that issue.  We therefore lack jurisdiction to review it.  See 8 U.S.C. 
                                              
1 The Superior Court also issued an opinion affirming this conviction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Oliynyk, No. 1325 EDA 2014, 2015 WL 6410311 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 
30, 2015). 
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§ 1252(d)(1); Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 119-21 (3d Cir. 2008); Malu v. Att’y 
Gen., 764 F.3d 1282, 1287–90 (11th Cir. 2014).  Thus, as we noted above, we conclude 
that Oliynyk has been convicted of an aggravated felony, and our jurisdiction is limited to 
legal and constitutional issues.  The aggravated-felony conviction also renders Oliynyk 
ineligible for asylum, see § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(2)(B)(i), and, because his maximum 
sentence exceeded five years, withholding of removal, see § 1231(b)(3)(B); Bovkun v. 
Ashcroft, 283 F.3d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 2002). 
Oliynyk next argues that the IJ erred by failing to continue a hearing because he 
was ill.  However, we have ruled that “[t]he denial of a motion for a continuance is 
discretionary,” and does “not raise a constitutional claim or question of law covered by 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D)’s judicial review provision.”  Rachak v. Att’y Gen., 734 F.3d 214, 216–
17 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks, alteration omitted).  Thus, we lack jurisdiction to 
review this discretionary decision.  Moreover, even assuming that there might be a way to 
frame such a claim as alleging denial of due process, see generally Hoxha v. Holder, 559 
F.3d 157, 163 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009), Oliynyk would not prevail here.  In response to 
Oliynyk’s claim that he was sick, the IJ directed his court officer and the Government 
attorney to call the medical facility at Oliynyk’s prison.  Counsel for the Government said 
that he was told there was no reason that Oliynyk could not participate in court that day, 
and the court officer testified that a nurse reported that Oliynyk was taking just a mild 
medication for stomach trouble and did not have a doctor’s appointment scheduled for 
another month.  See A.R. at 227-29.  Moreover, the record shows that, despite his 
assertions of illness, Oliynyk represented himself aggressively and without any apparent 
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limitation.  Thus, to the extent Oliynyk asserts this as a due-process argument, we reject 
it.  See Khan v. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 226, 236 (3d Cir. 2006) (to make successful due-
process claim, alien “must show that he was prevented from reasonably presenting his 
case” (quoting Uspango v. Ashcroft, 289 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2002)).  
Oliynyk also argues that his due-process rights were violated by the failure of the 
agency to transcribe a hearing that was held on June 26, 2017.  He is right that this 
transcript does not appear in the record.  However, the mere absence of a transcript does 
not mean that an alien is deprived of his due-process rights.  See United States v. Medina, 
236 F.3d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir. 2001).  To be entitled to relief, Oliynyk must demonstrate 
that he was prejudiced by the alleged due-process violation—that is, that a complete 
transcript might have changed the outcome of his case.  See Ortiz-Salas v. INS, 992 F.2d 
105, 106 (7th Cir. 1993).  He contends that, in the June 26, 2017 hearing, he designated 
as countries of removal the United Kingdom, Germany, or Switzerland, and that the 
agency incorrectly determined that he declined to designate a country.  See generally 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2) (providing rules for selecting country of removal).  However, he did 
not make this argument before the BIA.  See A.R. at 9.  While we apply the exhaustion 
rules liberally in the immigration context, see Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 121 (3d 
Cir. 2008), Oliynyk did not so much as hint in his brief to the BIA that he had designated 
a country for removal, and never mentioned the United Kingdom, Germany, or 
Switzerland at all.  Thus, we lack jurisdiction to consider this claim.   
Next, Oliynyk contends that the removal proceedings should have been terminated 
because there was a defect in the initial notice to appear (NTA).  The record on this claim 
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is somewhat confused.  It does appear that DHS served an NTA on Oliynyk on May 23, 
2017 (which Oliynyk refused to sign), but that the NTA was, for reasons that are nowhere 
explained, rejected by the Executive Office for Immigration Review on May 25, 2017.  
See A.R. at 51-52, 70, 200.  Because the NTA was rejected, DHS served it again on June 
16, 2017.  However, the substance of the two documents was the same (it is not clear 
whether DHS simply refiled the same document or filed a new document with the same 
charges), see A.R. at 200, and Oliynyk was informed of the operative charges before his 
hearing, see id. at 201.  Thus, Oliynyk has not shown that he was prejudiced by the fact 
that DHS served a second NTA.  See generally Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 
465 n.4 (3d Cir. 2009) (alleged shortcoming in NTA was harmless because the petitioner 
“was adequately apprised of the issue”). 
Finally, Oliynyk challenges the BIA’s conclusion that he failed to show that he 
was entitled to CAT relief.  However, the BIA’s key conclusions—that the IJ “did not 
clearly err in assessing country conditions or in forecasting the likelihood that the 
respondent would be tortured upon return to Ukraine,” BIA Op. at 3—are factual 
determinations, see Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2010), and thus 
are beyond our jurisdiction to review, see Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 343 n.12 (3d 
Cir. 2012).   
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.   
 
